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RICHARDS II TAKES A BITE OUT OF 
FORENSIC SCIENCE 
Michelle Cornell-Davis* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 21, 2016, William Richards walked out of West Valley 
Detention Center in Rancho Cucamonga, California with his arms 
raised in triumph.1 After fifteen years of wrongful imprisonment, 
Richards had been released.2 His long journey to exoneration 
included two trips to the California Supreme Court and the 
amendment of a law. When asked what he wanted to do first now 
that he was out of prison, Richards responded that he just wanted 
some real food to eat.3 
The story of William Richards is an incredible one. His case 
speaks to how some wrongful convictions occur and what steps can 
and should be taken to prevent them. In re Richards (Richards I)4 
and In re Richards II (Richards II),5 provide an insightful example of 
the ongoing court-legislature dialogue taking place as a result of the 
larger national conversation on the need for reliable forensic science 
standards in criminal cases.6 The conversation began because data 
 
        *     J.D. Candidate, May 2018, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. Thanks to the editors and 
staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their help in editing this Article. Thanks 
especially to Paula Mitchell and Hayden Adams for their guidance, feedback, and encouragement. 
Lastly, thanks to my family and friends for their support. 
 1. Man Convicted Of Killing His Wife 23 Years Ago Released From Prison In 
Rancho Cucamonga, CBS L.A. (June 21, 2016, 6:06 PM), 
http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2016/06/21/man-convicted-of-killing-his-wife-23-years-ago-
released-from-prison-in-rancho-cucamonga. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. 289 P.3d 860 (Cal. 2012). 
 5. 371 P.3d 195 (Cal. 2016). 
 6. See EXECUTIVE OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. 
AND TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF 
FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (Sept. 2016) [hereinafter PCAST Report], 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_forensic_s
cience_report_final.pdf  (advising the President on the state of forensic science and 
recommending steps to ensure validity of forensic sciences used in the courtroom); see also Judge 
Alex Kozinski, Rejecting Voodoo Science in the Courtroom, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 19, 2016, 
50.3 CORNELL-DAVIS[CORRECTED 10-28].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/18  5:20 PM 
506 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:505 
gleaned from wrongful conviction cases nationwide have exposed 
numerous and serious flaws in what has passed as forensic science in 
the courtroom.7 Today, the National Registry of Exonerations counts 
2,006 people who have been exonerated since 1989.8 Of these 1,905 
cases, an estimated 480 of them involved false or misleading forensic 
evidence.9 Richards I and Richards II illustrate how the California 
Supreme Court and the California Legislature addressed the use of 
false or misleading forensic evidence in a case involving bitemark 
evidence. 
Following this introduction, Part II discusses the factual 
background that led to William Richards’s wrongful conviction and 
the procedural journey that led to his eventual release. Part III 
analyzes the outcome of the case in light of the current dialogue 
about forensic science. Part IV concludes that the court’s decision, 
and the legislature’s response—amending a statute to address the 
problem identified by the court—are steps in the right direction 
towards alleviating some of the wrongs caused by the unreliability of 
some forensic sciences administered in criminal investigations. 
II.  BACKGROUND AND STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  The Scene 
Though August 10, 1993, started out as an average day for 
William Richards, by that evening it would turn into the stuff of 
 
7:36 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/rejecting-voodoo-science-in-the-courtroom-1474328199 
(calling for swift implementation of the PCAST Report recommendations and criticizing the use 
of unreliable forensic science in the courtroom). 
 7. For example, the National Registry of Exonerations is a project developed by the 
University of California Irvine, the University of Michigan Law School, and the Michigan State 
University College of Law. The purpose of the Registry is to “collect[], analyze[], and 
disseminate[] information about all known exonerations of innocent criminal defendants in the 
United States, from 1989 to the present.” Our Mission, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/mission.aspx (last visited Apr. 1, 2016). 
 8. Detailed View, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/about.aspx (from “Using the Registry” tab, 
select “Detailed View”) (last visited Apr. 1, 2016). 
 9. Id. (from “Using the Registry” tab, select “Detailed View”; then filter by “False or 
Misleading Forensic Evidence”). The National Registry finds “false or misleading forensic 
evidence” when an “[e]xoneree’s conviction was based at least in part on forensic information 
that was (1) caused by errors in forensic testing, (2) based on unreliable or unproven methods, (3) 
expressed with exaggerated and misleading confidence, or (4) fraudulent.” False or Misleading 
Forensic Evidence (F/MFE), NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, 
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/glossary.aspx#FMFE (last visited Oct. 27, 
2016). 
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nightmares.10 Just after midnight, Richards came home from work to 
a horrifying scene.11 His wife, Pamela Richards, had been manually 
strangled, severely beaten with two fist-sized rocks, and her skull 
was crushed with a concrete steppingstone.12 At the time, William 
and Pamela were living on an isolated piece of “property in the 
Mojave Desert in San Bernardino County.”13 
Upon discovering her body, Richards called 911 three times: 
once at 11:58 p.m. and then twice more in the next half hour.14 San 
Bernardino County Sheriff’s Deputy Nourse arrived at the scene 
shortly after 12:30 a.m.15 However, it would be about three more 
hours before any homicide detectives arrived and another few hours 
after that until the scene itself was finally processed.16 During that 
time, the police failed to secure the Richards’s dogs, and the dogs 
partially buried Pamela during the night.17 
Richards quickly became a suspect when police were unable to 
find anyone else who had been present at the crime scene.18 He was 
charged with his wife’s murder, and in 1997, after three mistrials, a 
jury found him guilty.19 At trial, the evidence against Richards was 
thin. The prosecution’s “evidentiary silver bullet”20 was a lesion 
found on Pamela’s body that allegedly matched Richards’s teeth.21 
During the fourth trial, the prosecution called Dr. Norman Sperber, 
an odontologist, to testify as a forensic dental expert and explain the 
comparison and match.22 Dr. Sperber testified that the lesion was an 
abnormal human bitemark.23 He further testified that the mark 
 
 10. Update: William Richards Released on June 21, 2016!, CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
https://californiainnocenceproject.org/read-their-stories/william-richards (last visited Nov. 8, 
2016). 
 11. Richards II, 371 P.3d 195, 199 (2016). 
 12. Id. at 198, 200. 
 13. Id. at 197. 
 14. Id. at 198. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 199. 
 17. Richards II, 371 P.3d at 199. 
 18. See id. 
 19. Id. at 197. The first two mistrials were due to hung juries. The third mistrial was due to 
the trial court recusing itself during jury selection. In the fourth trial, the jury was deadlocked 
until it received further instruction on “reasonable doubt,” after which it found Richards guilty of 
first degree murder. Id. 
 20. Michelle Ahronovitz, SB 694: How Low Can You Go? Reducing the Evidentiary 
Standard for State Habeas Corpus Petitions, 47 THE U. OF PAC. L. REV. 616, 617 (2016). 
 21. Richards II, 371 P.3d at 201–02. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 202. 
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matched a casting of Richards’s teeth and that, based on his personal 
experience, “one or two or less” out of 100 people would have such a 
dental abnormality.24 Richards was sentenced to 25 years to life, and 
in August 2000, his conviction was affirmed on appeal.25 
B.  Post-Conviction Procedural History 
1.  Subsequent Habeas Proceedings 
In 2007, Richards filed a writ of habeas corpus in San 
Bernardino County Superior Court.26 His habeas petition asserted 
that his conviction was based on false evidence and that there was 
now new evidence proving his innocence.27 
A key part of Richards’s evidence was a declaration from Dr. 
Sperber, the prosecution’s forensic dentist, in which he repudiated 
his trial testimony regarding the bitemark match.28 Dr. Sperber’s 
declaration stated, “With the benefit of all of the photographs [of the 
crime scene and Pamela’s injuries], and with my added experience, I 
would not now testify as I did in 1997.”29 He further stated, “I cannot 
now say with certainty that the injury on the victim’s hand is a 
human bitemark injury.”30 
The 2007 habeas petition not only included Dr. Sperber’s 
recantation, but also other declarations and reports by forensic dental 
experts.31 Using new technology not previously available at 
Richards’s jury trial, they corrected the angular distortion from the 
autopsy photograph and compared the corrected photograph to a 
digital exemplar of Richards’s lower teeth.32 Based on their 
comparisons, the experts could not positively state that it was 
Richards’s bitemark on the victim’s hand.33 
 The superior court granted Richards habeas relief, and the 
district attorney appealed.34 The court of appeal reversed the ruling, 
 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 197. 
 26. In re Richards, No. E049135, 2010 WL 4681260, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010). 
 27. Id. 
 28. Richards I, 289 P.3d 860, 863 (2012). 
 29. Id. at 866. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. at 871. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. In re Richards, No. E049135, 2010 WL 4681260, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 19, 2010). 
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on the ground that “the new evidence . . . failed to undermine the 
prosecution’s entire case and point unerringly to his innocence.”35 
Then, in 2013, the California Supreme Court upheld the court of 
appeal’s reversal by a 4-3 majority.36 The court reasoned that Dr. 
Sperber’s recanted testimony did not qualify as “false evidence” 
under California Penal Code Section 1473.37 This section provided 
that “a writ of habeas corpus may be prosecuted for, but not limited 
to, the following reasons: (1) False evidence that is substantially 
material or probative on the issue of guilt or punishment was 
introduced against a person at any hearing or trial relating to his or 
her incarceration. . . .”38 The court interpreted “false evidence” to 
mean that unless there were “any significant advances in the expert’s 
field of expertise or in any technologies employed by the expert,” the 
witness’s original opinion is not actually false merely because the 
opinion changes at a later date.39 The court held that neither Dr. 
Sperber’s recantation nor the new technology used by the other 
experts was enough to show that Sperber’s trial testimony was 
“objectively untrue.”40 
Having found that Richards failed to satisfy the “false evidence” 
standard, the court then turned to whether he met the “new evidence” 
standard for habeas relief, which, at the time, required new evidence 
to “point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability.”41 After 
analyzing the cumulative effect of all the evidence presented in the 
habeas petition, the court found that he also failed to meet this 
standard, and consequently denied him habeas relief.42 
The Richards I dissent, however, maintained that the majority 
incorrectly “heighten[ed] the standard of proof required to show the 
falsity of expert testimony” and that the underlying basis of Dr. 
Sperber’s testimony, as well as Dr. Sperber’s ultimate conclusion, 
had been proven false by a preponderance of the evidence.43 Given 
the impact of Dr. Sperber’s trial testimony on the jury, the dissent 
 
 35. Id. at *16. 
 36. Richards I, 289 P.3d at 863–64. 
 37. Id. at 863–64. 
 38. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1473 (West 2016). 
 39. Richards I, 289 P.3d at 872; Richards II, 371 P.3d 195, 206 (2016). 
 40. Richards I, 289 P.3d at 872. 
 41. In re Clark, 855 P.2d 729, 739 (Cal. 1993) (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 51 Cal. 3d 1179, 
1246 (1990)). 
 42. Richards I, 289 P.3d at 876. 
 43. Id. at 880 (Liu, J., dissenting). 
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concluded that it was also “reasonably probable that the verdict 
would have been different without his testimony.”44 
2.  Legislative Response to Richards I 
In response to the Richards I interpretation of false evidence, the 
California legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1058, which 
added subdivision (e)(1) to section 1473, effective January 1, 2015.45 
Subdivision (e)(1) states, “For purposes of this section, ‘false 
evidence’ includes opinions of experts that have either been 
repudiated by the expert who originally provided the opinion at a 
hearing or trial or that have been undermined by later scientific 
research or technological advances.”46 In revising this section, the 
California legislature specifically sought to address and correct the 
Richards I decision.47 The Committee Report for the bill reiterated 
that California’s false testimony statutes were designed to “protect an 
individual from wrongful incarceration due to the false testimony of 
a witness.”48 The report noted that the Richards I decision failed to 
do this because it created “a higher bar” for overturning wrongful 
convictions in cases of false expert testimony, effectively creating an 
unjust distinction between the standard used for false testimony of 
laypersons and expert witnesses.49 The report found that this 
interpretation of section 1473 was “unreasonable and exacerbates the 
problem of wrongful convictions,” and concluded that “[q]uite 
simply, this bill will keep innocent people out of prison.”50 
III.  THE REASONING OF THE COURT IN RICHARDS II 
Richards filed another habeas petition in response to the 
legislative change.51 He contended that under the newly amended 
Section 1473, his conviction should be overturned.52 The court 
decided his new petition in May 2016.53 
 
 44. Id. at 883; Richards II, 371 P.3d at 208. 
 45. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (Deering 2017); Richards II, 371 P.3d at 196–97. 
 46. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (Deering 2017). 
 47. Richards II, 371 P.3d at 196–97. 
 48. Assem. Comm. on Public Safety, Analysis of S.B. 1058, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., at 4 
(Cal. 2014). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Richards II, 371 P.3d at 195. 
 52. Id. at 197. 
 53. Id. 
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In Richards II, the court concluded that under the new 
legislation, an expert witness opinion could later be considered “false 
evidence” under two circumstances: (1) if the expert repudiates his or 
her own opinion given at trial; or (2) if the opinion given at trial is 
undermined by subsequent “scientific research or technological 
advances.”54 Under this new standard, the California Supreme Court 
held that Dr. Sperber’s bitemark testimony qualified as false 
evidence under both circumstances.55 
Applying the first circumstance to this case, the court held it was 
clear from Dr. Sperber’s later declaration that Dr. Sperber repudiated 
his trial testimony.56 Applying the second circumstance to the case, 
the court held that new technological advances also undermined Dr. 
Sperber’s trial testimony because technology that was not available 
at the time of Richards’s 1997 jury trial was used to correct the 
angular distortion of the lesion depicted in the autopsy photograph, 
and the corrected photograph formed the basis of the experts’ 
opinions during the habeas proceedings.57 
The Attorney General argued that Richards’s false evidence 
claim was a masked attempt to present a sufficiency of the evidence 
claim, because if Dr. Sperber’s testimony was disregarded, the rest of 
the trial evidence must still be considered and reweighed in 
evaluating his guilt.58 The Attorney General contended this was 
impermissible because a sufficiency of the evidence claim is not a 
cognizable habeas corpus claim.59 The court rejected this argument, 
stating that once a petitioner established false evidence, the standard 
for relief is met as long as the false evidence is “material.”60 
Evidence is material “if there is a ‘reasonable probability’ that, had it 
not been introduced, the result would have been different.”61 
Reasonable probability is established when the reviewing court’s 
assurance in the outcome is undermined.62 Thus, a court must 
determine whether the false evidence is material, rather than 
 
 54. Id. at 207. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Richards II, 371 P.3d at 208. 
 58. Id. at 209. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. In re Roberts, 60 P.3d 165, 174 (Cal. 2003). 
 62. In re Malone, 911 P.2d 468, 488 (Cal. 1996). 
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examining whether the verdict may still be supported without the 
false evidence.63 
Applying the materiality standard, the court held that Dr. 
Sperber’s testimony was, indeed, material.64 During the 1997 trial, 
the defense had a substantial response to the prosecution’s case, 
except for the bitemark evidence.65 Based on the facts of the case, it 
was reasonably probable that the false evidence presented by Dr. 
Sperber at Richards’s 1997 jury trial affected the outcome of that 
proceeding, especially given his impressive credentials at the time.66 
The court thus held Richards had met the burden of demonstrating 
“false evidence” under both circumstances and that the false 
evidence was material, and consequently granted Richards habeas 
relief.67 
IV.  ANALYSIS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF RICHARDS II 
It is the position of this Comment that Richards II was decided 
correctly. First, the new legislation was appropriately applied to the 
facts of the case; second, the petition was not successive because the 
claim was based on new legislation; and third, the outcome parallels 
the current national conversation about the reliability of forensic 
evidence, including bitemark comparison. 
A.  The Court-Legislature Dialogue 
On its own, Richards II is a straightforward application of the 
law. The court received a new standard that was specifically directed 
at remedying the injustice of Richards I.68 Applying the new 
standard, the court found that Dr. Sperber’s trial testimony 
constituted false evidence and granted Richards relief. Thus, the 
court upheld the purpose of the new legislation: to eliminate an 
“unjust distinction” between lay and expert testimony, which if left 
 
 63. Richards II, 371 P.3d at 209. 
 64. Id. at 210–11. 
 65. Id. (including responses to shoe prints, blood spatter, and the time of death). 
 66. Id. at 210. (credentials included more than 40 years of dentistry experience, acting as 
chief forensic dentist for two counties, testifying in more than 100 cases, and receiving “a 
congressional appointment to set up a national system to identify missing persons through dental 
records.”). 
 67. Id. at 211. 
 68. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (Deering 2017); Richards II, 371 P.3d at 196–97. 
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uncorrected would “[exacerbate] the problem of wrongful 
convictions.”69 
Yet, when viewed in its procedural context, Richards II serves 
as an encouraging example of court-legislature dialogue and a 
heartening shift in policy for prisoners seeking exoneration. Because 
of the procedural posture of this case and the conversation between 
the legislature and the courts, there is now stronger, clearer statutory 
language, which will allow innocent persons convicted by faulty 
forensic evidence to more easily seek post-conviction review of their 
cases.70 
Moreover, Richards II is part of a broader dialogue taking place 
in California about standards for habeas petitions. For example, until 
recently there was no codified standard of proof for a habeas petition 
brought on the basis of new evidence.71 The standard was based on 
case law which held new evidence “must undermine the entire 
prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced 
culpability,” and “if a reasonable jury could have rejected the 
evidence presented, a petitioner has not satisfied his burden.”72 This 
demanding standard, which was one of the highest in the nation,73 
was eliminated when Senate Bill 1134 was signed into effect in 
September 2016.74 Under the new amendment to Cal. Penal Code 
section 1473, the standard was lowered to “new evidence exists that 
is credible, material, presented without substantial delay, and of such 
decisive force and value that it would have more likely than not 
changed the outcome at trial.”75 This amendment makes California’s 
post-conviction standard for new evidence consistent with the 
post-conviction standards of 43 other states.76 These changes in law 
regarding standards for false evidence and new evidence, of which 
the Richards saga has played a part, will hopefully lead to more 
exonerations in cases of wrongful convictions in California and 
“[give] a fallible system a better chance to remedy mistakes.”77 
 
 69. S. B. No. 1058, Reg. Sess. 2013–2014 (Cal. June 13, 2014). 
 70. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1473(e)(1) (Deering 2017). 
 71. Assemb. Comm. on Public Safety, Analysis of S.B. 1134, at 7 (Cal. 2016). 
 72. In re Lawley, 179 P.3d 891, 897 (Cal. 2008). 
 73. S. Rules Comm., Analysis of S.B. 1134, at 7 (Cal. 2016). 
 74. S.B. No. 1134, Ch. 785 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
 75. Id. 
 76. S. Rules Comm., Analysis of S.B. 1134, at 5 (Cal. 2016). 
 77. Jaclyn Gioiosa, New Bill Makes It Easier for the Wrongfully Convicted to Prove Their 
Innocence, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT (Sept. 28, 2016), http://law.scu.edu/northern-california-
50.3 CORNELL-DAVIS[CORRECTED 10-28].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/28/18  5:20 PM 
514 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50:505 
B.  Bitemark Evidence 
The need for a more inclusive false evidence standard for habeas 
petitions is uniquely highlighted in the Richards case because 
bitemark comparison is a particularly unreliable forensic science. 
Forensic odontology, which is the application of dentistry to the law, 
has come under heavy criticism in recent years.78 Forensic 
odontology includes several fields of study, such as identification of 
unknown remains, bitemark comparison, interpretation of oral injury, 
and dental malpractice.79 Bitemark comparison, which was used in 
Richards’s case, is considered the most controversial of these areas.80 
Forensic identification for bitemarks involves two steps.81 The 
first step is comparison, where the expert compares a mark or imprint 
to a known source to determine whether they are similar enough to 
be called a match.82 The second step considers “the probability that 
the imprint and implement came from the same source.”83 Significant 
risks of error are involved in both of these steps.84 Bitemarks face 
practical difficulties.85 Because skin is elastic, pliable, and reactive, it 
is not a reliable material for bitemark transfers.86 Skin stretches, 
swells, bruises, and becomes inflamed, all of which can lead to 
distorted images of the biter’s dentition.87 Additionally, “no thorough 
 
innocence-project/new-bill-makes-it-easier-for-the-wrongfully-convicted-to-prove-their-
innocence. 
 78. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A 
PATH FORWARD 42 (2009) [hereinafter NAS Report], 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf. Furthermore, this criticism has not just 
been limited to the world of forensic science; bitemark science has also garnered attention in the 
national media. See Radley Balko, How the Flawed “Science” of Bite Mark Analysis Has Sent 
Innocent People to Prison, WASH. POST (Feb. 13, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2015/02/13/how-the-flawed-science-of-
bite-mark-analysis-has-sent-innocent-people-to-jail/ (part one of a four part article series 
discussing the flaws and history of bitemark evidence). 
 79. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 173. 
 80. Id. Key areas of contention include “the accuracy of human skin as a reliable registration 
material for bitemarks, the uniqueness of human dentition, the techniques used for analysis, and 
the role of examiner bias.” Id. at 178. 
 81. Adam Deitch, An Inconvenient Tooth: Forensic Odontology Is an Inadmissible Junk 
Science When It Is Used to Match Teeth to Bitemarks in Skin, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1205, 1216 
(2009). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 175. 
 86. Brief for Michael J. Saks et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 20, In re 
Richards, 371 P.3d 195 (Cal. 2016) (No. S223651) [hereinafter Amici Brief]. 
 87. Id. 
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study has been conducted of large populations to establish the 
uniqueness of bitemarks [and] theoretical studies include more teeth 
than are seen in most bitemarks submitted for comparison.”88 There 
is also “no central repository of bitemarks and patterns.”89 Thus, it is 
possible that a purported match may not actually be a match at all, or 
could be the result of coincidence.90 
In addition to the disputed methods involved, forensic 
odontology “suffers from the potential for large bias among bitemark 
experts.”91 This bias can arise because of police agencies providing 
“the suspects for comparison and a limited number of models from 
which to choose from in comparing the evidence.”92 Bias may also 
arise as a result of the pressure to identify a suspect in “highly 
sensationalized and prejudicial cases.”93 Moreover, this bias remains 
uncorrected because blind comparisons, or a second expert’s opinion, 
are rarely called for.94 
Finally, there is an unsettling lack of standardization across the 
field.95 Although the American Board of Forensic Odontology has 
developed guidelines for the analysis of bitemarks, there is still no 
general agreement among practicing forensic odontologists regarding 
national or international standards for comparison.96 Experts have 
differed widely in their evaluations in many instances, and “forensic 
dentists are free to use whichever method they happen to be familiar 
with or prefer.”97 
Given the lack of standardization and the inherent imprecision 
of scientific methods employed in bitemark matching, many critics 
have called into question the current use of bitemark matching in 
criminal investigations. The most prominent critique of bitemark 
evidence came in a report in 2009 by the National Research Council, 
a subdivision of the National Academy of Sciences.98 The council 
 
 88. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 174. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 174–75. 
 93. Id. at 175. 
 94. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 175. 
 95. Id.; Amici Brief, supra note 86, at 20–21. 
 96. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 175; Amici Brief, supra note 86, at 20–21. 
 97. Amici Brief, supra note 86, at 21. 
 98. NAS Report, supra note 78, at iii. The goal of the council is to “associate the broad 
community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and 
advising the federal government.” Id. 
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concluded that there was “no evidence of an existing scientific basis 
for identifying an individual to the exclusion of all others,” and 
found “a lack of valid evidence to support many of the assumptions 
made by forensic dentists during bitemark comparisons.”99 Further, 
in an amicus brief submitted in the Richards II case, a set of 
scientists, statisticians, law-and-science scholars, and practitioners 
found that the foundations for bitemark identification were 
unsound.100 They suggest that future research may solve some of the 
issues of bitemark identification, but conclude that bitemark experts 
“have yet to establish either the validity of their approach or the 
accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly 
ineffective in addressing this problem.”101 
Most recently, a report released by the President’s Council of 
Advisors on Science and Technology (“PCAST”) in September 2016 
concluded, “bitemark analysis does not meet the scientific standards 
for foundational validity, and is far from meeting such standards.”102 
The report acknowledges that some practitioners fear the fall of 
bitemark evidence in the courtroom because it “could hamper efforts 
to convict defendants in some cases.”103 Yet the report counters that 
if this is a true concern, the answer is not to “admit expert testimony 
based on invalid and unreliable methods, but rather to attempt to 
develop scientifically valid methods.”104 Ultimately, the PCAST 
reporters conclude that the probability of making bitemark analysis 
scientifically reliable is low, and they advise against putting 
resources into it.105 
Considering these acknowledgements that bitemark evidence is 
less of a science and more of a guessing game, bitemark evidence 
should not be relied upon in any degree.106 If bitemark science is not 
 
 99. Id. at 176 (quoting D. Sweet & I. A. Pretty, The Scientific Basis for Human Bitemark 
Analysis—A Critical Review, 41 SCI. & JUST. 85, 85–92 (2001)). 
 100. See generally Amici Brief, supra note 86. 
 101. Id. at 45 (quoting NAS Report, supra note 78, at 53). 
 102. PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 87. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Deitch, supra note 81, at 1205 (concluding that courts should refuse to admit bitemark 
matching testimony in the courtroom); Paul C. Giannelli, Bite Mark Testimony Under Attack, 31 
CRIM. JUST., Summer 2016, at 40, 40–41 (2016) (concluding that bitemark science “should be 
challenged at every trial in which it is offered”). 
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to be disregarded entirely, there must be a safety net for prisoners 
who have been wrongfully convicted by faulty science. 
C.  Richards II and the Future of Forensic Science 
Richards II was not just decided correctly because bitemark 
evidence is unreliable. In addition to bitemark evidence, many other 
types of forensic science have recently been called into question.107 
There has been increasing recognition that many of the methods used 
in the forensic sciences are outdated.108 In the wake of the mounting 
number of exonerations and the growing awareness of faulty forensic 
science, Richards II stands as an important guard against unreliable 
or changing fields of forensic science. 
When forensic tests, such as bitemark matching, were first 
developed, they were often created in crime laboratories to evaluate 
evidence from a particular crime scene.109 As a result, many 
techniques were never subjected to scientific scrutiny or analysis, 
and researching their limitations and foundations has not been a top 
priority.110 Despite this, many forensic sciences were long considered 
highly reliable. However, since criminal investigators began 
employing DNA analysis in the 1980s, this view of forensic sciences 
has begun to change.111 DNA analysis is now used to reexamine 
cases of prisoners who claim they are innocent. As a result of DNA 
testing, the number of exonerations has grown rapidly across the 
country in recent years.112 Many of the prior convictions which have 
been overturned involved faulty forensic science,113 calling into 
question entire fields of expertise.114 For example, arson science, 
which was once highly regarded, is now largely considered a “junk 
science” and may have led to the wrongful execution of Todd 
 
 107. See PCAST Report, supra note 6. 
 108. Id.; see also Richards I, 289 P.3d 860, 877 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting). 
 109. NAS Report, supra note 78, at 42. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 40. 
 112. PCAST Report, supra note 6, at 26. 
 113. Id. (“DNA-based re-examination of past cases, moreover, has led so far to the 
exonerations of 342 defendants, including 20 who had been sentenced to death, and to the 
identification of 147 real perpetrators.”). 
 114. Judge Alex Kozinski, Criminal Law 2.0, 44 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., i, v 
(2015) (A few of these questionable “sciences” include bloodstain pattern identification, foot and 
tire print identification, and ballistics.). 
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Willingham.115 Hair microscopy, which is the matching and 
comparison of hairs, has also been significantly undermined, as 
illustrated in the case of Santae Tribble.116 Other types of pattern 
evidence, including firearm analysis and shoeprint comparison, 
remain highly suspect.117 
Considering the widespread and justifiable skepticism 
concerning the use of forensic science, the standard employed in 
Richards I was neither just nor appropriate. It created a false 
distinction between lay testimony and expert witness testimony.118 
Under Richards I, an eyewitness could recant his testimony based on 
his being mistaken at the time and satisfy the false evidence standard 
“because the perceptual basis for [his] eyewitness testimony turned 
out to be false.”119 Yet the testimony of an expert witness, whose 
opinions are also dependent on inferential and perceptual abilities, 
needed to be objectively false before a court could consider it false 
evidence.120 As the dissent in Richards I correctly observed, there is 
no reason to treat expert testimony differently: “Just as the truth or 
falsity of eyewitness testimony under section 1473(b) depends on the 
truth or falsity of underlying facts concerning the witness’s 
perceptual abilities, the truth or falsity of expert testimony depends 
on the truth or falsity of underlying facts essential to the expert’s 
inferential method and ultimate opinion.”121 
Richards II eliminates the distinction between expert and lay 
opinion testimony and makes it possible for petitioners to establish 
false evidence through recanting expert testimony. The California 
 
 115. David Grann, Trial by Fire, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009, 
http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2009/09/07/trial-by-fire. 
 116. For example, Santae Tribble was convicted of murder and sentenced to twenty years in a 
case where the only physical evidence against him were strands of hair found at the scene. The 
hairs, which the forensic hair expert at trial testified belonged to Tribble at odds of 10 million to 
1, were retested in 2012. It was discovered that one of those hairs belonged to a dog. Spencer S. 
Hsu, Santae Tribble Cleared in 1978 Murder Based on DNA Hair Test, WASH. POST, (Dec. 14, 
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/dc-judge-exonerates-santae-tribble-of-1978-
murder-based-on-dna-hair-test/2012/12/14/da71ce00-d02c-11e1-b630-
190a983a2e0d_story.html?utm_term=.4eacaf84a78a. 
 117. Kozinski, supra note 114, at v. 
 118. See Richards I, 289 P.3d 860, 876 (Cal. 2012) (Liu, J., dissenting). 
 119. Id. at 877. 
 120. Id. at 870–71 (majority opinion) (“[W]hen new expert opinion testimony is offered that 
criticizes or casts doubt on opinion testimony given at trial, one has not necessarily established 
that the opinion at trial was false. Rather, in that situation one has merely demonstrated the 
subjective component of expert opinion testimony.”). 
 121. Id. at 878 (Liu, J., dissenting). 
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District Attorney’s Association opposed the passing of Senate Bill 
1058, arguing that eliminating this distinction was unnecessary.122 
The Association claimed that false expert witness testimony was 
sufficiently addressed through laws already in place, such as perjury 
laws.123 However, perjury statutes do not protect against false 
testimony the expert witness believed to be correct at the time.124 
Thus, Richards II and the amended standard for false evidence are 
appropriate because they allow a habeas petitioner to challenge false 
expert testimony made in good faith, while still “protecting the 
credibility and reputation of expert witnesses.”125 
Neither should critics be concerned that amendments like Senate 
Bill 1058 and cases like Richards II weaken the finality of judgments 
and undermine the adversarial and legal system. While there are 
important reasons for ensuring finality in the criminal justice system, 
finality exists in tension with ensuring the accuracy of outcomes.126 
Richards II will not overthrow that balance. First, the Richards II 
standard is not too low; even the California District Attorney’s 
Association agrees that “persons who have been convicted as a result 
of flawed opinion should be able to file for a writ of habeas 
corpus.”127 Richards II and the new standard eliminate the distinction 
between lay witnesses and expert witnesses, but a court must still 
“make a finding that it is reasonably probable that the verdict at trial 
would have been different without the expert’s testimony before 
granting habeas relief.”128 Additionally, concerns about finality may 
also be alleviated by participation from the executive branch in this 
current dialogue. Though Richards’s case primarily involves the 
conversation between the court and the legislature, the executive 
branch also has an opportunity to participate in the conversation. For 
example, one form of participation is through conviction review 
 
 122. S.B. No. 1058, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., at 5–6 (Cal. 2014). 
 123. Id. 
 124. Natasha Machado, Chapter 623: Giving the Wrongfully Convicted A Better Chance at 
Review, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 387, 393 (2014). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Laurie L. Levenson, Searching for Injustice: The Challenge of Postconviction Discovery, 
Investigation, and Litigation, 87 S. CAL. L. REV., 545, 551 (2014). Legitimate reasons for finality 
include allowing victims “if possible, [to] move on with their lives, and [allowing] law 
enforcement officials and prosecutors [to] begin to address other cases.” Id. at 546. 
 127. S.B. No. 1058, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., at 6 (Cal. 2014). 
 128. Assemb. Comm. on Public Safety, Analysis of S.B. 1058, 2013–2014 Reg. Sess., at 4 
(Cal. 2014). 
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units. These units originated in Santa Clara, California, in 2004 and 
Dallas, Texas, in 2007.129 The purpose of these units is to “[conduct] 
extrajudicial, fact-based review[s] of secured convictions to 
investigate plausible allegations of actual innocence.”130 Conviction 
review units are typically part of the local prosecutor’s office and are 
“dedicated to collaborative, good-faith case reviews designed to 
ensure the factual integrity of a conviction should be independent, 
flexible, and transparent in its work.”131 Through these units, the 
executive branch can constructively participate while still equally 
focusing on accuracy and finality. 
The criminal justice system at the very least should 
acknowledge the growth, development, and change that take place in 
forensic science in order to ensure accuracy, as well as finality.132 A 
system that convicts an innocent person based on unreliable science 
and data is not a reliable system, and it needs a mechanism for 
correcting what will be inevitable wrongs. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Certain areas of forensic science, particularly bitemark 
comparison, are now considered unreliable or outdated. Furthermore, 
forensic sciences are not static. As technology develops, the 
methodology in these fields changes with it. People used to think the 
Earth was flat, but if the sailor today decided to navigate his ship 
based on the idea that the earth was flat, he would be considered 
crazy. The same is true for forensic science. Why would we choose 
to affirm decisions based on the opinions of experts who used 
methods we know to be outdated and unreliable, especially in light of 
an expert’s recantation of prior testimony? 
Cases like Richards II and laws like California Penal Code 
section 1473 are vital in updating our legal system to reflect the 
reality of scientific progress. Some who are convicted are not guilty, 
and to hold an innocent person in prison based on a technical 
definition of “false evidence” is unjust. What Richards II illustrates 
is that we have robust systems in place to address flaws once they are 
 
 129. John Hollway, Conviction Review Units: A National Perspective, PENN L.: FAC. 
SCHOLARSHIP, Apr. 2016, at 1, 10 n.5, 
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1614. 
 130. Id. at 2. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Levenson, supra note 126, at 551. 
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identified. It is heartening to see that both the courts and the 
legislatures are now attuned to the forensic evidence issues that are 
surfacing with increased frequency, and that they are prepared to 
address these critical issues. 
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